结构实在论和物理学的客观性——牛津大学物理哲学讨论会
2009-02-27
2009年2月26日，牛津物理哲学小组召开讨论会，本次讨论的题目是“结构实在论和物理学的客观性” （Structural realism and the objects of physics），主讲人是Katherine Brading。此次讨论会主要围绕Ladyman和French提出的结构实在论对传统实在论提出的一种“形而上学非充分决定性”展开，主要针对物理学特殊理论的语境中对种非充分决定性提出的挑战进行了讨论。
Katherine Brading主讲的内容摘要如下：
Ladyman and French have argued for ontic structural realism using an argument that begins from an alleged “metaphysical underdetermination” facing object-oriented realism. Current discussions have focussed on challenging this underdetermination in the context of specific theories in physics. I will discuss whether or not the argument succeeds even if the underdetermination is granted. I think that it fails, and I will talk about why this is. There is a positive outcome for structural realists, however, because the resources that the ontic structural realist employs when developing the argument from metaphysical underdetermination can be re-deployed to create a more promising strategy.
In discussing why the argument fails, I will talk about an approach to the objects of physics that is independent of discussions of individuality, and this will give me an excuse for a diversion through some Newton, and maybe even Descartes, time permitting.